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over possible syntheses between liberal and communitarian theories, 
where the most important political question is: If communitarian-
ism and liberalism can be shed of the "historical imagination"-
that is, communitarianism purged of its historical love for hierarchy 
and exclusion, and liberalism viewed without its negative Marxist 
gloss and thereby revealed as having the potential to achieve human 
equality and freedom-at what point are the two philosophies in 
fundamental conflict? Can the idea of "liberal community" Ap-
pleby attempts to locate in the thought of the Founding Fathers rest 
on the common aspiration of both philosophies, at least in their 
contemporary forms, for equality, inclusion and freedom for all 
human beings? Appleby, an historian, does not even attempt to an-
swer this question, but her evidence contributes significantly to the 
synthetic project by making clear that the vision of liberalism held 
up by post-Marxist historians excludes crucial elements which may 
explain its appeal not only to eighteenth-century Americans but to 
the twentieth-century revolutionaries of Eastern Europe and the So-
viet Union. Indeed, the question of synthesis may have special sig-
nificance for politicians and scholars in those countries, where the 
attempt to construct stable democratic institutions presents political 
leaders with the inescapable necessity of finding a permanent way to 
balance strong communitarian socialization with liberal yearnings 
for equality, unassailable individual rights and freedom from domi-
nation by the state. 
CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CON-
GRESS, 1863-1869. By Earl M. Maltz.t Lawrence: Univer-
sity Press of Kansas. 1990. Pp. xiii, 198. $25.00. 
Michael P. Zuckert 2 
Earl Maltz mostly has the right idea about the Fourteenth 
Amendment. That is no small matter in a field so fertile with schol-
arly squabbling as this one is. Text, history and current significance 
all conspire to make the Amendment one of the most pock-marked 
battle fields of our legal wars of the words. The language of the 
Amendment, it is often said, presents hardly more determinative 
meaning than an ink blot: large terms, full of sound and ominous 
boding, but signifying nothing very specific. Historical investiga-
tion has not produced much more decisive evidence about the origi-
I. Professor of Law, Rutgers University (Camden). 
2. Congdon Professor of Political Science, Carleton College. 
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nal meaning of the Amendment either. Those who drafted and 
defended the Amendment spoke in the same large and vague terms 
as they wrote; moreover, most of the decisive discussion of the lan-
guage of the Amendment occurred in a committee for which we 
lack the potentially most revealing records. Private papers help 
very little. Finally, so much is at stake in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment that scholars and judges face every temptation, provocation 
and incentive to make of the spotty textual and historical record 
what they will. The history of the interpretation of the Amendment 
stands as a powerful comment on the wisdom of the Lord's Prayer: 
"Lead us not into temptation." 
Maltz explicitly locates his study relative to the prevailing de-
bate over the intended effect of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
implicitly in relation to ongoing debates about originalist interpreta-
tion. On the latter subject he has written extensively and intelli-
gently in the journals, and one can only wish that he had been more 
explicit in this book on its connections to these debates. Maltz has 
been at once one of the more outspoken and more sensible defenders 
of an originalist approach. He has cogently questioned what has 
now become a near orthodoxy in the pages of scholars like Ronald 
Dworkin and jurists like William Brennan, that establishment of 
original intent is impossible. His Fourteenth Amendment book 
stands as an effort at a case study showing the greatly overstated 
character of the Dworkin-Brennan claims. Maltz approaches his 
task in a fully sophisticated manner, aware of the various pitfalls 
critics of originalism declaim. He is especially attuned to problems 
of collective intention. Maltz shows that patient, thorough and im-
aginative analysis can indeed recapture the meanings of the histori-
cal actors in this particular set of events. In part, Maltz is the 
beneficiary of a long-term scholarly siege on the materials surround-
ing the Amendment. He is able to take advantage of the kind of 
process of discovery his predecessors engaged in and the sorting out 
of facts, concepts and interpretations that has come before. 
His own contribution is not negligible, however. He attempts 
to pin down a meaning for the Amendment by triangulating in on it 
from a variety of different locations, defining thereby the space in 
which the discourse of framing became possible. He draws heavily 
on considerations of the general political context, alternative gen-
eral theories about federalism, rights, and other relevant legal and 
political matters, extra-congressional comment on Reconstruction 
issues, and the much-studied congressional debates themselves. 
Through his method of triangulation he builds a persuasive case for 
almost every aspect of his substantive interpretation, and for the 
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general proposition that discovering the intent behind a legal enact-
ment is not more mysterious than, say, discovering the relation be-
tw~n pi-mesons, quarks, and bosuns in the composition of the 
umverse. 
Maltz does not force his materials into a false pattern or find 
more uniformity and order than were patently present. He is able 
to concede what many other scholars have emphasized, that there 
was a good deal of disagreement among the drafters, there were 
indeed cases where some (at least) were confused about what they 
were doing, and where political considerations may have suggested 
open-ended vagueness as preferable to determinate clarity. None-
theless, he argues these factors interfere far less with the interpreta-
tive effort than they are frequently taken to do. He finds the 
disagreement and confusion to have existed in a far more structured 
manner than the Dworkins of the world care to admit. There were 
not nearly as many understandings of the Reconstruction enact-
ments as there were participants in the process; only a few relatively 
well-defined positions emerged, and those tended to persist over a 
number of different issues and over a long period of time. 
Although his methodology is complex, the two main ideas of it 
can be stated rather briefly. There may have been differences 
among sponsors of the Reconstruction legislation, but we must be 
careful to find the position which could win a consensus, or enough 
of a consensus to gain the required majority. Thus he rejects Jaco-
bus ten Broek's approach of relying heavily on Democratic opposi-
tion exaggeration of what the various laws would accomplish. He 
also rejects the approach of Hyman and Wiecek, who tend to accept 
uncritically the point of view of the most "advanced" advocates of 
the measures as definitive. Instead, he notices a dynamic whereby 
the moderate Republicans held the balance of power. He shows in 
case after case that although some wanted more (Stevens, Sumner, 
et al.) and others wanted less (the Democrats), the outcome was 
almost always defined by the position taken on an issue by the 
Moderates. A majority, especially a two-thirds majority, could be 
assembled only when the moderates went along. 
The majorities that enacted the Reconstruction measures were, 
therefore, coalitions composed of elements not in perfect agreement 
on everything. But Maltz does not infer from this fact Chief Justice 
Warren's lame "inconclusive" assessment. The coalition members 
might well have sought different things in a world they controlled, 
but the agreement they reached was not a chaotic amalgam of dis-
parate aims, but the position the moderates were willing to go along 
with. That radicals wanted more was irrelevant. In order to estab-
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lish the character of the different groups and of the coalition agree-
ments, Maltz pays sensitive attention to the different proposals 
under debate and develops various devices for identifying coalition 
and sub-group positions, including extensive use of roll-call 
analyses. 
He supplements his more internal analyses by setting the whole 
in a broader political context. Far from finding the politics a source 
of unintelligibility, he tries to show how the politics help fix one or 
another interpretation as more likely. With regard to the Four-
teenth Amendment itself, he is quite persuasive in showing how the 
political role the Amendment was to play in the congressional elec-
tions of 1866 rendered certain competing interpretations of the 
Amendment quite implausible. He shows, moreover, that by 1870 
and 1871 the context had shifted so that positions earlier seen as 
political liabilities (e.g., extensive congressional authority to reach 
into the states), came to be seen as more attractive; he shows further 
how, by the time of the Fifteenth Amendment, yet further shifts 
had made black suffrage, theretofore a political liability, into a 
promising political stance. 
Substantively Maltz stakes out ground between the two chief 
approaches to the Amendment. He is most hostile to the interpreta-
tion emanating from scholars like ten Broek, Hyman and Wiecek, 
and Kaczorowski to the effect that the Reconstruction Amend-
ments worked an entire transformation in the antebellum constitu-
tional system, traditional federalism giving way to full-scale 
nationalism, accompanied by a new and open-ended protection of 
rights, capacious enough to incorporate all and more that the War-
ren Court attempted to do with the amendments. He speaks as 
though he is much more friendly to the narrower view of what the 
Amendment accomplished, associated with earlier scholars like 
Charles Fairman and more recent ones like Raoul Berger. In fact 
he differs substantially from the latter group also. 
He agrees, for example, with the broader interpreters that the 
Amendment's privileges and immunities clause does incorporate the 
Bill of Rights, and while he does not present such a comprehensive 
statement on this as Michael Curtis recently did, he adds some per-
suasive arguments to the brief Curtis drew up. Maltz argues that 
t~e equal protection clause is about protection of the laws, and not 
about equality; more formally, he argues the Amendment sought to 
establish a doctrine of "limited absolute equality," i.e., to establish 
absolute protection for a certain class of rights (natural rights, 
rights to governmental protection directly related to natural rights). 
He contrasts this to current approaches which emphasize the issue 
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of classification and see the Amendment as directed at prohibiting 
all racial classifications or see it affirming a set of germinative rights 
possessing the mysterious power to grow ever larger and more nu-
merous. In other words, he rejects equally the approaches to the 
Amendment of the first Justice Harlan, Justice Brennan and 
Michael J. Perry. 
Above all, he argues, the framers of the amendments, or the 
core group of moderate Republicans retained sufficient attachment 
to the principles of the federal system to restrain them from all ven-
tures of the sort the more far-reaching interpreters attribute to 
them. Thus, he insists, the Amendment does embody the state ac-
tion doctrine, just as the court said in the Civil Rights Cases, and 
contrary to the claim of some important Republican drafters in 
1870-71. It does not, in other words, empower Congress to reach 
private action, much less do so of its own accord. 
Had I written this book, I would surely have cast much of it in 
different terms, and gone about it in different ways in many places, 
but as should be clear I would endorse most of Maltz's conclusions. 
One exception to that general concurrence would be the aforemen-
tioned argument regarding the power of Congress under the 
Amendment. As a gesture toward "truth in reviewing" I must con-
fess to having argued in the pages of this very journal some years 
ago (1986) in favor of the idea that the Amendment authorized 
what I called the state failure doctrine: if the states demonstrably 
fail to supply the protection they are obliged to supply under the 
equal protection clause, then Congress has the right to step in and 
supply it. This is neither the doctrine of state action Maltz and 
other narrow interpreters endorse, nor the more or less plenary 
power doctrine broad interpreters defend. It is a doctrine consistent 
with the Framers' commitment to the traditional federal system, as 
the plenary power doctrine is not, and with the commitment to con-
stitutionally guarantee certain rights previously not guaranteed, as 
the state action doctrine is not. 
Maltz rejects the state failure doctrine, or as he calls it, the 
"supplemental protection theory," for a number of reasons I pro-
pose to review here, for they not only give a more corporeal in-
stance of his mode of analysis, but also point to certain limits to his 
method. The most important piece of evidence Maltz brings for-
ward is the congressional rejection in February 1866 of an ear~r 
draft of the Amendment, a draft couched in language of congres-
sional empowerment rather than prohibitions against the states as 
in the adopted Amendment. Maltz believes that the rejection of the 
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earlier draft proves the centrist Republican refusal to accept any-
thing more than a state action Amendment. 
Republican opposition to the original proposal was based 
broadly on the fear it would be seen as embodying a supplemen-
tal protection theory. If they had believed that the ultimate 
wording of section one reflected a similar theory, conservative 
moderates would have been unlikely to embrace it without pro-
test. Yet no moderate assailed section one of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Maltz's style of argument here reflects one of his chief methodologi-
cal principles: "the significance of language not chosen cannot be 
overestimated." 
Maltz's point here, however, is founded on at least one false 
factual premise: so far as Republicans opposed the earlier draft, 
and so far as they did so on federalism-related grounds, their con-
cern was not with the state-failure approach, but with the plenary 
power approach some of them feared was authorized by that draft 
of the amendment. In his own restatement of the debate over the 
earlier draft, Maltz described as "the basic theme . . . in all of the 
denunciations of Bingham's proposal" the fear "that it would create 
a revolution in federalism by granting the federal government ple-
nary authority to perform the most basic functions of government 
... the protection of life, liberty, and property." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) Or, as Maltz summarized the debate: "The discussion of the 
Bingham amendment revealed that a substantial portion of the 
party-the more conservative moderates-would not accept an 
open-ended expansion of the authority of the federal government." 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
Maltz concedes that many of the Republican drafters adopted 
a state failure interpretation of the Amendment during debates on 
civil rights legislation in 1870 and 1871. Maltz wonders how relia-
ble the later debates are, however: they could well be "law office 
history." He finds the 1871 defenses of a state failure approach to 
be inconsistent with what was said in 1866 by, among others, Bing-
ham. "Bingham consistently denied any intention of granting Con-
gress any authority to define substantive rights of life, liberty, and 
property." That may be so, but the state failure doctrine does not 
conflict with that position. At most it gives Congress the power to 
supply protection to those persons a state is failing to protect at a 
level equal to the protection the state is supplying to others. It does 
not involve fresh or independent definition of rights. 
More generally, some of the limits to Maltz's approach to the 
Amendment come to light here. He is surely correct to suggest that 
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the state failure doctrine was not explicitly discussed during the de-
bates on the Amendment itself in 1866. Perhaps he is correct that 
had it been discussed, it would have been rejected, although this is 
highly speculative, and I can imagine a good argument to the con-
trary. The state failure theory was not discussed, not because the 
drafters were planting a Trojan horse in the Amendment, but be-
cause the situation posed by the Black Codes and the response 
taken in the 1866 Civil Rights Act filled their minds and few, per-
haps, consciously thought of, much less consciously signed off on 
the state failure doctrine. Yet, a legal text, like many human utter-
ances, means more than the congery of specific instances a person 
has in mind when making the utterance. 
For example, a person giving a definition of a triangle as a 
three-sided enclosed plane figure may not picture to herself an ob-
tuse triangle, and may be surprised when confronted with one. 
Nonetheless, she surely can rightly be said to have intended obtuse 
triangles in her definition, whether she knew it at the time or not. 
The language of the Amendment does the same. There is a logic to 
the conceptual structure which is present whether the drafters were 
fully conscious of all its implications or not. Indeed, this is one of 
the most commonplace of our experiences of the law; much of the 
judicial function turns precisely on courts having to decide how law 
applies in instances not obviously and consciously intended by the 
drafters, and yet somehow intended. Maltz does not give sufficient 
weight to phenomena of this sort in his treatment of the history of 
the Reconstruction legislation, nor in his theoretical approach to 
the problem of originalism. This relates, perhaps, to another char-
acteristic of his approach. He tends not to pay sufficient attention 
to text, preferring to go behind text to intention as revealed in all 
the imaginative and helpful ways he illustrates in this book. None-
theless, we must remember it is the text that is part of the Constitu-
tion and not the sum of all that was said about it in and out of 
Congress. 
These comments are not, I think, mere quibbles, but yet they 
must not be allowed to derogate from an extremely valuable and 
mostly very sound book. Earl Maltz mostly does have the right 
idea about the Fourteenth Amendment, and that is no small matter. 
